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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT AND CASE HISTORY 
Jurisdiction lies with this Court pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(j) (Supp. 1989). Plaintiff brings this appeal 
from the December 7, 1989 order by the Third Judicial District 
Court of Salt Lake County, the Honorable Michael R. Murphy 
presiding, granting summary judgment in favor of defendant State 
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, and dismissing with 
prejudice plaintiff's amended complaint against defendant. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Did the trial court err in dismissing with prejudice 
plaintiff's first and second causes of action for breach of con-
tract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing? 
2. Did plaintiff waive her claims against State Farm by 
her settling the underlying related action? 
3. Has plaintiff waived or abandoned any claim of error 
on the dismissal of her third cause of action for fraud? 
4. Did the affidavit of Milton Q. Beck raise any issues 
of material fact in a third-party type claim? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
On review of a summary judgment, the party against whom 
the judgment has been granted is entitled to have all the facts 
presented, and all the inferences fairly arising therefrom, con-
sidered in a light most favorable to him. To sustain a summary 
judgment, the pleadings, evidence, admissions, and inferences 
therefrom, viewed most favorably to the losing party, must show 
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that there is no genuine issue of material fact, and that the pre-
vailing party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. 
Geneva Pipe Co. v. S&H Ins. Co., 714 P.2d 648 (Utah 1986); English 
v. Kienke, 774 P.2d 1154 (Utah Ct.App. 1989). 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES 
Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is the 
sole determinative authority on appeal. Rule 56(c), U.R.C.P., 
provides in pertinent part: 
The judgment sought shall be rendered forth-
with if the pleadings, depositions, answers 
to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show 
that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On March 12, 1984, plaintiff Fay Pixton was involved in 
an automobile accident with an unattended runaway vehicle owned by 
Robert J. Davies. (R. 190) At the time of her accident, plain-
tiff was insured by defendant State Farm Mutual Automobile 
Insurance Company (hereinafter "State Farm") under Policy No. 
477-64-44 (hereinafter the "Pixton policy"). (R. 189-190) Robert 
Davies, at the time of the accident, was also insured by defendant 
State Farm under his own policy of insurance (hereinafter the 
"Davies policy"). (R. 190) 
Immediately following her accident, plaintiff sought 
treatment at a local hospital for her injuries. Plaintiff was 
diagnosed at the hospital as having suffered abrasions to her 
kneecap and wrist. (Id.) Plaintiff received treatment for her 
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injuries from several physicians, including Dr. Edward C. Spencer. 
A Dr. Matthews referred plaintiff to Dr. Edward C. Spencer for 
treatment. (R. 220, 241-42) At all times, Dr. Spencer's care and 
treatment of plaintiff were within the acceptable medical standards 
of the community. (R. 240) Dr. Spencer's treatment and evalua-
tion of plaintiff's injuries were not influenced or affected by 
any actions of State Farm. (icL ) 
On or about July 5, 1984, State Farm's claims handling 
agent, Felix Jensen, contacted International Rehabilitation 
Associates, Inc. (hereinafter "IRA") to assist in evaluating 
plaintiff's medical condition. (R. 99, 220) State Farm and IRA 
enjoy a long-standing relationship in which State Farm 
periodically hires IRA to assess all factors connected with the 
recovery of an insured or claimant, including coordinating goal-
directed medical treatment and evaluating the outcome of the 
treatment plan once treatment is completed. (R. 220-21) 
At all times, State Farm promptly and fully reimbursed 
plaintiff for all out-of-pocket medical expenses and other 
expenses incurred by her in connection with the medical treatments 
necessitated by her injuries. State Farm paid a total of $871.51 
to plaintiff pursuant to plaintiff's first-party personal injury 
protection or no-fault insurance coverage with State Farm. 
(R. 236-38) At the time of her automobile accident, the no-fault 
threshold under Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-309 was $500. 
Plaintiff subsequently made a third-party claim or demand 
upon State Farm, as the liability insurer of the alleged 
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tortfeasor, Robert J. Davies, for additional damages allegedly 
sustained by her in the automobile accident of March 12, 1984. 
State Farm initially offered the sum of $2,500 to plaintiff to 
settle her third-party claims under Davies' liability coverage 
with State Farm. Plaintiff refused State Farm's offer. (R. 
194-95) Thereafter, plaintiff demanded that State Farm and IRA 
inform her of the costs of services rendered by IRA for State Farm 
in evaluating her medical treatment and condition. Both State 
Farm and IRA refused. (R. 189-201) 
On or about March 4, 1987, plaintiff brought this action 
against State Farm and IRA alleging various causes of action. 
Plaintiff alleged that State Farm had breached its insurance con-
tract with plaintiff, had breached the implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing, had conspired to deny plaintiff access to 
the courts, and had negligently engaged in unfair or deceptive 
practices. (R. 2-13) Plaintiff subsequently amended her com-
plaint to allege causes of action in breach of contract, breach of 
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and fraud 
against State Farm. (R. 190-201) 
On or about December 8, 1987, plaintiff filed suit in the 
Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County against Robert 
J. Davies and one of Mr. Davies' employees, Carl Hothan, for her 
damages and injuries arising out of the accident of March 12, 
1984. (R. 222, 303) Plaintiff's suit against Davies and Hothan 
was assigned to the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick. See, Third 
Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, C87-7987 (hereinafter 
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the "underlying related action,") 
During the pendency of the underlying related action, 
plaintiff's counsel served interrogatories on defendants Davies 
and Hothan requesting that State Farm identify the number of pay-
ments made by State Farm to IRA and the total amount paid by State 
Farm which was claimed "exempt from the plaintiff's claim . . . ." 
(R. 304) On or about April 18, 1988, counsel for Davies and 
Hothan disclosed that State Farm had paid $871.51 for plaintiff's 
medical expenses, $708.00 for plaintiff's lost services, and 
$1,960.09 for IRA's services. (R. 93, R. 304) On or about May 
24, 1988, copies of the drafts from State Farm to IRA were 
forwarded to plaintiff's counsel for his review. (R. 305) 
In this litigation and in the underlying related action, 
State Farm took the position that the cost of IRA's evaluation 
services was properly categorized as a "file expense," rather than 
a "medical expense." State Farm's characterization of the cost of 
IRA's services did not impact plaintiff's right to bring the 
underlying related action against Davies and Hothan because 
plaintiff had already reached the applicable $500.00 no-fault 
threshold under Utah law. 
On or about December 21, 1988, IRA moved for summary 
judgment on plaintiff's claims. IRA's motion was granted on April 
4, 1989. (R. 204-05) Plaintiff has never perfected an appeal 
from the order dismissing her claims against IRA. 
During the course of the underlying related action, 
plaintiff's counsel sought a determination from Judge Frederick 
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that the $1,960.09 paid by State Farm to IRA constituted "medical 
expenses." Judge Frederick refused to rule on the plaintiff's 
motion prior to the time of trial. (R. 363 at pp. 9-10) Rather 
than press for a ruling at trial, plaintiff on or about May 9, 
1989, agreed to accept the sum of $7,500.00 in full and complete 
satisfaction of her claims against the alleged tortfeasors, Robert 
J. Davies and Carl Hothan. (R. 195, 303-06) The underlying 
related action was dismissed with prejudice by stipulation of the 
parties and by order of the trial court. (R. 306) 
After settlement of the underlying related action, on or 
about May 12, 1989, plaintiff filed her amended complaint against 
State Farm asserting breach of contract, breach of the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and fraud. (R. 190-201) 
Plaintiff's asserted causes of action arise out of State Farm's 
alleged wrongful refusal to disclose the cost of the evaluative 
services rendered by IRA for State Farm, State Farm's alleged 
wrongful "failure" to disclose the purpose of IRA's services, and 
State Farm's alleged improper relationship with Dr. Edward C. 
Spencer, plaintiff's treating physician. (Id.) 
On or about July 5, 1990, defendant State Farm moved for 
summary judgment on plaintiff's amended complaint. Following 
extensive briefing and oral argument, the Third Judicial District 
Court of Salt Lake County, the Honorable Michael R. Murphy 
presiding, on December 7, 1989, entered an order granting State 
Farm's motion for summary judgment. (R. 351-53) 
Plaintiff now appeals from the December 7, 1989 order 
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summarily dismissing her claims with prejudice. On appeal, plain-
tiff's docketing statement alleged that the granting of summary 
judgment on her three causes of action was in error. However, 
based upon the issues raised in plaintiff's brief, plaintiff 
apparently confesses no error in the trial court's granting of 
summary judgment on plaintiff's third cause of action for fraud. 
This Court's review of the trial court's ruling is, therefore, 
limited to the dismissal of plaintiff's claims of breach of con-
tract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In order to maintain a cause of action for breach of an 
insurance contract or insurer bad faith, plaintiff and State Farm 
must have been in privity of contract at the time of the alleged 
wrong. Plaintiff makes no claim and presents no evidence that 
State Farm failed to fully and satisfactorily perform its 
contractual duties to pay no-fault benefits to plaintiff under her 
insurance policy contract. Plaintiff's claims in this case con-
cern solely State Farm's actions in not initially disclosing those 
expenses related to IRA's services and State Farm's internal 
characterization of those expenses as "file expenses." As such, 
plaintiff contends that State Farm was somehow guilty of bad faith 
in the handling of her third-party claim against Robert Davies and 
Carl Hothan, also State Farm insureds. Plaintiff has no standing 
to assert contract based claims regarding State Farm's treatment 
of her as a third-party claimant, since she was not a party to the 
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contract for liability coverage between Davies and State Farm. 
Plaintiff's actions in not pursuing a ruling before Judge 
Frederick in the underlying related action concerning the 
disclosure and proper characterization of IRA's services and 
expenses and eventually settling that action, constitute a waiver 
of plaintiff's claims against defendant State Farm. 
Plaintiff's failure to brief the propriety of the trial 
court's dismissal of her third cause of action further bars any 
assignment of error on that issue on appeal. 
The affidavit of Milton Q. Beck submitted by plaintiff 
failed to create a genuine issue of material fact. Mr. Beck's 
affidavit misapplies the pertinent rule of law in the State of 
Utah relative to a claim of bad faith by a claimant against a 
tortfeasor's insurer. Mr. Beck's affidavit most importantly 
failed to refute the undisputed evidence that State Farm fully and 
promptly satisfied its duties to plaintiff for no-fault benefits 
under her own policy of insurance. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT 
AND BREACH OF THE IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD 
FAITH AND FAIR DEALING WERE PROPERLY 
DISMISSED BY THE TRIAL COURT BECAUSE 
PLAINTIFF HAS NO STANDING TO BRING SUCH 
CLAIMS AGAINST STATE FARM. 
Plaintiff, on appeal and in the court below, asserts that 
State Farm breached various contractual duties, both express and 
implied, owed to plaintiff. In reviewing plaintiff's assignments 
of error, this Court must categorize State Farm's duties, if any, 
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in accordance with the relationship between the parties and the 
coverages provided under the two pertinent State Farm insurance 
policies, the Pixton policy and the Davies policy. Although not 
clearly set forth in plaintiff's brief, plaintiff had separate and 
distinct claims against each of the two respective insurance poli-
cies issued by State Farm. Plaintiff had claim against State Farm 
under her own insurance policy for first-party personal injury 
protection ("PIP") or "no-fault" benefits. Plaintiff also had 
claim against State Farm, through the alleged tortfeasor, Davies, 
for third-party liability benefits under the Davies policy. 
The legal and contractual relationships between the par-
ties in the instant action and the underlying related action 
define the scope of State Farm's duties to plaintiff. In the 
first-party context where plaintiff was entitled by contract to 
recover "no-fault" benefits under her own policy, the relation 
between State Farm and plaintiff was purely contractual. Beck v. 
Farmers Ins. Exchange, 701 P.2d 795, 800 (Utah 1985). In essence, 
an insurer in a first-party claim has the primary duty not to 
withhold unreasonably insurance benefits due under its insured's 
own policy. In first-party claims where an insured makes claim 
against its own insurer, no fiduciary relationship of trust or 
reliance is created by the insurance contract. Ic3. Practically 
speaking, in first-party claims, an insurer and its insureds are 
adversaries. Lyon v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co., 25 Utah 
2d 311, 480 P.2d 739, 745 (1971), overruled on other grounds, 701 
P.2d 798 (1985) . 
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In the context of third party claims brought by an 
injured party against the tortfeasor's insurer, both contractual 
and fiduciary duties run between the insured tortfeasor and his 
insurance carrier. In handling, adjusting, and settling third-
party claims, the tortfeasor's insurer owes a duty only to its 
insured, namely to accept reasonable settlements. Such duties are 
most pronounced in cases involving the risk of excess verdicts. 
Plaintiff, nevertheless, suggests that third-party claims 
also give rise to an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing 
between the tortfeasor's insurer and the injured party. 
Plaintiff's reliance on Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal.3d 566, 
108 Cal.Rptr. 887, 510 P.2d 1032 (1970), and Beck v. Farmers Ins. 
Exchange, 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985), in support of such a proposi-
tion is ill-founded. Even a casual review of plaintiff's 
authorities reveals that neither case involved a third-party 
claim. Gruenberg arose out of an insurer's bad faith actions in 
investigating a first-party fire loss of its own insured. In 
Beck, the Utah Supreme Court recognized a contract-based cause of 
action for insurer bad faith in the context of a first-party 
uninsured motorist claim. 
While no Utah case has ever expressly dealt with whether 
an insurer owes a duty of good faith and fair dealing to a 
claimant, those jurisdictions which have addressed the issue have 
squarely rejected a duty of good faith between an insurer and a 
claimant. See O.K. Lumber v. Providence Washington Ins. Co., 759 
P.2d 523, 525-26 (Alaska 1988); Scroggins v. Allstate Ins. Co., 74 
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Ill.App.3d 1027, 393 N.E.2d 718, 720-21 (1979); Auclair v. 
Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 505 A.2d 431 (R.I. 1986); Kranzush v. 
Badger State Mutual Casualty Co., 103 Wis.2d 56, 307 N.W.2d 256, 
259 (1981). Even the courts of California, which at one time rec-
ognized a duty of good faith between an insurer and a claimant in 
the handling of third-party claims, have now rejected any such 
duty. See Moradi-Shalal v. Superior Court, 46 Cal.3d 287, 250 
Cal.Rptr. 116, 758 P.2d 58 (1988), overruling, Royal Globe Ins. 
Co. v. Superior Court, 23 Cal.3d 880, 153 Cal.Rptr. 842, 592 P.2d 
329 (1979). See also, Murphy v. Allstate Ins. Co., 17 Cal.3d 937, 
132 Cal.Rptr. 424, 553 P.2d 584, 586-89 (1976). 
The Utah Supreme Court's pronouncement in Beck that 
insurance bad faith is a contract-based theory, rather than a tort 
theory, led this Court in Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 768 
P.2d 950, 958 (Utah Ct.App. 1989), to hold that, "In order to 
maintain an action under a contractual theory of insurer bad 
faith, the parties must be in privity of contract at the time of 
the alleged wrong." Since a claimant and a tortfeasor's insurer, 
in a third-party claim, are not in privity of contract, the 
injured claimant has no standing to bring an action against the 
insurer for breach of contract or bad faith, even if the injured 
party's insurer by coincidence also happens to be the tortfeasor's 
insurer. See Ammerman v. Farmers Ins. Exhange, 19 Utah 2d 261, 
430 P.2d 576 (1967) . 
In the instant case, plaintiff had two distinct and sepa-
rate claims against State Farm under two separate policies of 
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insurance. Plaintiff had a first-party claim for no-fault bene-
fits under her own policy; and plaintiff also had a third-party 
claim for both general and special damages against the tortfeasor, 
Davies, under his insurance policy with State Farm. While 
plaintiff is in privity of contract with State Farm under her own 
policy, plaintiff has no contractual privity with State Farm under 
the Davies policy. The mere fact that the alleged tortfeasor and 
the plaintiff were both State Farm insureds does not confer stand-
ing on plaintiff to bring the instant action sounding in contract 
against State Farm on Davies policy. Id. 
If plaintiff had claimed and established in the court 
below that State Farm had wrongfully denied or delayed her no-
fault benefits, plaintiff undisputably would have standing under 
her own insurance contract to bring suit for breach of contract 
and/or bad faith against State Farm. However, the undisputed 
facts in this case establish that State Farm promptly and fully 
reimbursed plaintiff for all covered expenses related to her 
accident, pursuant to her first-party no-fault coverage with State 
Farm. (R. 236-39) There is no evidence in the record that State 
Farm ever breached any express or implied contractual provision or 
duty with respect to plaintiff's claims under her own policy of 
insurance. 
Correctly viewed, this case arises solely out of 
plaintiff's claim that State Farm allegedly mishandled the 
investigation and settlement of her third-party claims against 
Robert Davies and Carl Hothan. Plaintiff simply has no standing 
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to bring the instant action against State Farm, asserting that 
State Farm unfairly or improperly handled her third-party claim 
against Davies and Hothan. At best, plaintiff may claim to be an 
incidental third-party beneficiary under the Davies policy. Utah 
law is clear, however, that incidental third-party beneficiaries 
may not bring an action in contract. See Tracy Collins Bank and 
Trust v. Dickamore, 652 P.2d 1314 (Utah 1982); Schwinghammer v. 
Alexander, 21 Utah 2d 418, 446 P.2d 414 (1968). As a result, 
plaintiff's claims for breach of contract and bad faith in the 
adjustment and settlement of her claims against the alleged 
tortfeasors were correctly dismissed by the trial court as a mat-
ter of law. 
Even assuming, arguendo, that plaintiff had standing to 
bring a contract-based action against State Farm for the company's 
handling of her third-party claim, plaintiff's assertion that 
State Farm allegedly acted improperly in creating a "conflict of 
interest" in permitting a single adjuster to handle both plain-
tiff's first and third-party claims fails. Plaintiff is unable to 
point to a single contractual duty, either express or implied, 
that would require separate adjusters to handle plaintiff's first 
and third-party claims. Plaintiff likewise fails to acknowledge 
that in the handling of her first-party claims, an insurer, its 
employees, and the insured are practically speaking adversaries. 
Lyon, 480 P.2d at 745. Under such circumstances, plaintiff's 
claim that State Farm's failure to employ multiple adjusters to 
handle her claims fails to sustain any allegations that State 
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Farm's actions amounted to a breach of contract or a breach of the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
POINT II. 
EVEN IF PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT STATED A 
CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF COULD BE GRANTED, 
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS HAVE BEEN WAIVED DUE 
TO HER SETTLEMENT OF THE UNDERLYING 
RELATED ACTION. 
Plaintiff's principal disputes in this case are with how 
State Farm handled and characterized the expenses related to the 
services of IRA. Plaintiff claims that State Farm's initial 
refusal to disclose the cost of IRA's services and State Farm's 
categorization of those expenses as "file expenses" deprived her 
of settling her case for "what it was worth." It should be first 
noted that case valuations, like potential jury verdict ranges, 
cannot be precisely ascertained or predicted. The value of each 
case turns upon its own merits, facts, and the eventual finder of 
fact, whether a jury, judge, or the parties themselves. 
In this case, the undisputed evidence is that plaintiff 
was given the information concerning the cost of IRA's services 
more than one year prior to her settlement with the alleged 
tortfeasors, Davies and Hothan. Plaintiff's voluntary and knowing 
action in accepting the settlement offer of $7,500 in the underly-
ing related action serves as an estoppel or a waiver of her claim 
that State Farm's settlement was unreasonable or inadequate. 
While State Farm's characterization of IRA's expenses may 
have arguably influenced State Farm's offers of settlement, State 
Farm's actions cannot be said to have improperly influenced 
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plaintiff's knowing and volitional act in accepting State Farm's 
offer. Plaintiff cannot ignore the fact that her settlement came 
more than one year after State Farm made a full disclosure of all 
expenses related to IRA's activities. The undisputed evidence in 
this case required the trial court to find that plaintiff waived 
her claims by accepting the settlement proceeds and stipulating to 
the dismissal of the underlying related action. 
Plaintiff also asserts that State Farm's initial settle-
ment offer of $2,500 and the company's later settlement for $7,500 
further evidenced State Farm's bad faith. It cannot be seriously 
contended by plaintiff that the alleged tortfeasors or their 
insurer, State Farm, had any legal duty to offer or pay anything 
to plaintiff for her third-party claim until the liability of the 
alleged tortfeasors and plaintiff's damages had been judicially 
determined. Furthermore, State Farm's actions did not deprive 
plaintiff of any right to negotiate a higher settlement or to 
proceed to trial in hopes of recovering more than $7,500 in 
damages. The fact that State Farm increased its original offer of 
settlement from $2,500 to $7,500 is evidence that State Farm was, 
in fact, willing to negotiate with plaintiff. Even assuming that 
plaintiff's rights to negotiate,and settle her claim for a more 
favorable amount were impaired by State Farm's actions, plaintiff 
waived any right to challenge the sufficiency and adequacy of her 
settlement by refusing to proceed to trial in the underlying 
related action in order to obtain a favorable ruling from Judge 
Frederick on the proper categorization of IRA's expenses, by 
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accepting the settlement proceeds, and by stipulating to the dis-
missal with prejudice of the underlying related action. 
Furthermore, affirmance of the trial court's order 
granting summary judgment in favor of State Farm is required due 
to plaintiff's inability to show any damages flowing from State 
Farm's initial refusal to disclose the cost of IRA's services and 
State Farm's characterization of those costs. State Farm paid 
plaintiff what it believed plaintiff's case to be worth, $7,500. 
Assuming that State Farm had characterized IRA's costs as "medical 
expenses" and readily disclosed those costs to plaintiff, as 
plaintiff claims should have been done, there is no evidence in 
the record that State Farm would have ever offered plaintiff more 
than $7,500 to settle her claims. Absent such evidence, 
plaintiff's claims were properly dismissed by the trial court. 
Plaintiff asserts in her brief that State Farm did not 
properly raise the affirmative defense of waiver in its answer. 
(Appellant's Brief at p. 16) State Farm respectfully submits that 
its answer to plaintiff's amended complaint contained the follow-
ing defense: 
5. That the plaintiff by her conduct either 
waived any claim that she may have against 
this defendant or in the alternative is 
estopped by virtue of her conduct from 
bringing any claims against this defendant. 
(R. 207) Despite plaintiff's contention to the contrary, the 
record demonstrates that State Farm affirmatively asserted the 
defenses of waiver and estoppel and, therefore, the trial court 
was correct in ruling as a matter of law that plaintiff waived any 
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potential claims she might have had against State Farm by accept-
ing the settlement in the underlying related action. 
POINT III. 
PLAINTIFF HAS WAIVED ANY CLAIM OF ERROR ON 
THE DISMISSAL OF HER THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
FOR FRAUD. 
Plaintiff's amended complaint contains various unfounded 
allegations that State Farm had engaged in fraudulent conduct in 
association with Dr. Edward C. Spencer and IRA. (R. 197-99) The 
trial court granted State Farm's motion for summary judgment on 
all causes of action, including the third cause of action for 
fraud. (R. 351-53) Plaintiff on January 5, 1990 duly filed her 
notice of appeal, preserving a potential claim of error on her 
third cause of action for fraud against State Farm. (R. 358-59) 
Plaintiff's docketing statement likewise indicated that the 
propriety of the court's ruling with respect to the plaintiff's 
claim of fraud would be raised on appeal. However, appellant's 
brief, dated July 11, 1990, contains no discussion or analysis of 
the plaintiff's claims of fraud on the part of State Farm. 
It is well established that an appellant's failure to 
raise an issue in the initial appellant's brief constitutes a 
waiver or abandonment of any assignment of error on that issue on 
appeal. See Union Oil Co. of California v. State, 677 P.2d 1256, 
1259 (Alaska 1984); Quality Furniture, Inc. v. Hay, 61 Hawaii 89, 
595 P.2d 1066, 1068 (1979); Northwest National Gas Co. v. 
Georgia-Pacific Corp., 53 Or.App. 89, 630 P.2d 1326, 1329 (1981), 
review denied, 291 Or. 893, 642 P.2d 309 (1981); Kurpjuweit v. 
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Northwestern Development Co., Inc., 708 P.2d 39, 46 (Wyo. 1985). 
As a result, appellant's failure to raise any issues relative to 
her third cause of action for fraud bars plaintiff from now 
asserting on appeal that the trial court erred in dismissing her 
claims of fraud. 
POINT IV. '- •. 
THE AFFIDAVIT OF MILTON Q. BECK DID NOT 
RAISE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT. 
On appeal, plaintiff asserts that the trial court 
improperly found that the affidavit of Milton Q. Beck failed to 
create a dispute as to any issue of material fact which would 
preclude the entry of summary judgment against plaintiff. 
Plaintiff urges first that the trial court erred in disregarding 
the affidavit of Mr. Beck because the court had not read the 
affidavit. (Appellant's Brief at p. 15) The transcript of the 
hearing on State Farm's motion for summary judgment reveals that 
the trial court initially had not been aware of the Beck affidavit 
because plaintiff did not file the affidavit in conjunction with 
State Farm's motion for summary judgment. (R. 36 3 at p. 11) In 
fact, the Beck affidavit had been filed more than seven months 
prior to the filing of State Farm's motion. (R. 90-95, 246-47) 
Nevertheless, after locating the affidavit in the file, Judge 
Murphy read the affidavit and permitted oral argument to continue. 
(R. 36 3 at p. 12) After further argument, the trial court held 
that the affidavit of Mr. Beck did not create a genuine issue of 
material fact, and ordered summary judgment in favor of State 
Farm. 
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The trial court's finding that the affidavit of Mr. Beck 
did not create an issue of fact in a third-party claim type of 
case was clearly correct. Plaintiff asserts that the Beck 
affidavit should preclude the entry of summary judgment, since 
similar affidavits of Mr. Beck were held to create issues of fact 
in Beck v. Farmers, 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985), and American Concept 
Ins. Co. v. Lochhead, 751 P.2d 271 (Utah Ct.App. 1988). 
Plaintiff fails to acknowledge that both Beck and 
Lochhead involved first-party claims. Beck arose out of an 
insurer's handling of its insured's uninsured motorist claim, and 
Lochhead arose out of an insurer's handling of its insured's 
first-party fire loss. Unlike Beck and Lochhead, this case 
involves a third-party claim where the insurer, State Farm, owes 
no duty to the claimant, plaintiff. Despite Mr. Beck's ill-
founded conclusion that State Farm owed contractual and fiduciary 
duties to a party not in privity of contract with State Farm, Utah 
law is clearly to the contrary. Mr. Beck's affidavit presupposes 
that the same standards should apply to an insurer handling a 
third-party claim with a claimant as with its own insureds in the 
handling of a first-party claim. Mr. Beck's affidavit addresses 
only State Farm's actions in the handling of plaintiff's third-
party claim against the alleged tortfeasors, Davies and Hothan. 
His affidavit is silent in rebutting the undisputed evidence that 
State Farm promptly and fully satisfied its contractual duties to 
plaintiff for no-fault benefits under her own insurance contract. 
As a result, the trial court was correct in holding that the Beck 
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affidavit failed to create a dispute as to any issue of material 
fact which would preclude summary judgment. The ruling of the 
trial court should, therefore, be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, defendant State Farm Mutual 
Automobile Insurance Company respectfully requests that this Court 
affirm the decision of the lower court, 
Dated this day of , 1990 
STRONG GXHANNI 
' ^J fo . 5hilip7R. Fishier 
Stephen J. Trayner 
Attorneys for State Farm 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this J2 rtk day of 
, 1990, four true and correct copies of the 
oing document were mailed, postage prepaid, to: 
Matt Biljanic 
7155 South 9th East 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
S45/Bnh 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
FAY I. PIXTON, : 
Plaintiff, 
vs. : 
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE : 
INSURANCE COMPANY OF 
BLOOMINGTON, ILLINOIS : 
Defendant. : 
AMENDED COMPLAINT 
Civil No. C 87-1665 
Judge Michael R. Murphy 
Comes now the above named Plaintiff and for her 
cause of action against State Farm Mutual Automobile 
Insurance Company of Bloomington, Illinois alleges as 
follows: 
1. Plaintiff is a resident of Salt Lake County 
State of Utah, and the facts giving rise to this cause of 
action occurred in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
2. That Defendant, State Farm Mutual Automobile 
Insurance, is an insurance company with its home office in 
Bloomington, Illinois, doing business in the State of Utah. 
3. That on March 12, 1984, the Plaintiff was 
..J^jife^ 
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insured by State Farm Mutual under policy #477-6467-44 
covering a 1973 Maverick with the following coverage: 
liability 50/100/25; $10,000.00, PIP, Emergency Road Service 
and Uninsured Motorist Coverage. 
4. That on March 12, 1984, Plaintiff was involved 
in an incident involving another insured of State Farm 
Mutual, Robert J. Davies. An unattended vehicle owned by 
Robert J. Davies as insured, and parked by an employee of 
Davies, struck the vehicle which Plaintiff was driving 
causing her to sustain injuries requiring medical attention. 
That liability rests clearly with the Davies vehicle. 
5. That Plaintiff incurred medical treatment at 
the emergency room of Alta Hospital and later from Dr. 
Edward C. Spencer. 
6. That Plaintiff, subsequent to March 12, 1984, 
was contacted by an employee of International Rehabilitation 
Associates Inc., concerning the injuries she sustained in 
the incident referred to in paragraph 4 above. 
7. That Plaintiff did not make any effort to 
contact the International Rehabilitation Associates Inc. 
regarding her injuries or rehabilitation, but rather was 
contacted by them without solicitation. Plaintiff assumes 
that State Farm, through its agent, Felix Jensen or some 
2 
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other employee of State Farm, was responsible for arranging 
the contact with Rehabilitation Associates. The purpose of 
contacting IRA was to obtain rehabilitation services • 
The Defendant failed to advise Plaintiff that IRA employees 
as registered nurses were hired by Defendant not to assist 
in Plaintiff's rehabilitation but rather as non-testimonial 
experts. (As per counsel, Phillip Fishier1s representation 
to the Court). 
8. That Plaintiff and International Rehabilitation 
Associates, Debi Johnson and Jan Wherry Mason, through 
contact and subsequent conduct established a fiduciary 
relationship as health care providers. Further, Plaintiff 
and State Farm Insurance Company by virtue of the insurance 
contract #477-6467-44 established a fiduciary relationship 
during the pendency of the policy. 
9. The insurance policy between Plaintiff and 
State Farm Insurance was in force and effective March 12, 
1984, the occasion where Plaintiff sustained injuries and 
damages which are the subject matter of this claim. 
Plaintiff had made all required premium payments. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Breach of Contract by State Farm) 
10. The Plaintiff hereby repleads all of the 
3 
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allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 9 as though 
fully set forth herein, 
11. After receiving the claim of the Plaintiff 
for damages she sustained on March 12, 1984, State Farm 
Mutual was under a duty, by virtue of its insurance contract 
with the Plaintiff, to process her claim promptly after 
making a reasonable investigation of the facts. 
12. That Plaintiff by virtue of the insurance 
contract with Defendant, State Farm,was entitled to 
reimbursement for property damages and any out of pocket 
expenses relating to medical care which was required because 
of the Plaintiff's injuries sustained in the incident 
involving State Farm's other insured. Further, the 
Plaintiff was entitled to recover damages for mental and 
physical pain and suffering. 
13. That Felix Jensen as an employee of State 
Farm directed the Plaintiff to IRA for what she believed was 
medical treatment of her injuries. That Felix Jensen failed 
to disclose the fact that IRA was used as a non-testimonial 
expert by IRA in many of its third party claims and in this 
case. 
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14. That State Farm through its employee Felix 
Jensen should have directed the Plaintiff to a medical 
doctor who did not have direct ties with State Farm as a 
medical expert or should have advised the Plaintiff of his 
relationship with the Defendant State Farm. 
15. That during the several months Plaintiff was 
seen by Dr. Edward C. Spencer, Felix Jensen retained the 
services of IRA as non-testimonial experts to evaluate the 
Plaintiff's claim. That Plaintiff believed that the two 
registered nurses of IRA upon contacting her were going to 
assist her in recovering from her injuries. She was never 
informed of their function as non-testimonial experts nor 
was she aware that State Farm was preparing for a lawsuit. 
16. That by the actions of State Farm insurance 
in creating a conflict of interest between the Plaintiff and 
what she believed were health care providers (Dr. Spencer 
and IRA) State Farm in effect breached its contract with the 
Plaintiff. That Plaintiff is entitled to consequential 
damages as a result of State Farm's breach as follows: 
(a) Plaintiff has been denied adequate medical 
care for the injuries she sustained March 12, 1984. That as 
a result of the delay in now obtaining medical attention her 
5 
situation has been aggravated and the medical problem more 
difficult to resolve. 
(b) That because of the fiduciary relationship of 
Plaintiff with State Farm, Dr. Edward C. Spencer, and the 
IRA employees and her perceived mistreatment, Plaintiff has 
suffered extreme emotional distress. 
The natural consequences of the breach of contract 
by State Farm by its actions as set forth above, clearly 
resulted in Plaintiff's suffering severe and permanent 
mental and physical damages. 
17. That as a part of her contract with State 
Farm the Plaintiff reasonably expected State Farm to process 
her claim promptly and with all necessary information 
required to fully evaluate her claim. That Plaintiff made 
demand upon State Farm to provide to her the amount of 
charges made by IRA to State Farm for what she believed were 
medical expenses. State Farm refused to divulge this 
information and said actions constituted a breach of its 
insurance contract with Plaintiff. 
18. That on May 30, 1985,State Farm tendered the 
sum of $2,500.00 to Plaintiff as a full compromise and 
settlement of her claim. Those actions of State Farm set 
forth in the previous paragraphs constitute an additional 
6 
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breach of contract. That as a result of State Farm's 
refusal to settle fairly and consistently with the customary 
practice in the industry the Plaintiff was required to 
employ the services of Matt Biljanic, attorney, on a 
contingent fee basis to recover her damages. That said 
attorney's fees were a direct result and consequence of 
Defendant's breach of contract. 
19. That as a result of the Defendants actions 
the Plaintiff compromised her claim against Defendant's 
insured, Robert J. Davies, for the sum of $7,500.00, 
substantially less than would normally be offered under 
similar facts. Further, Plaintiff has retained counsel on a 
1/3 contingency because of Defendant's refusal to settle in 
good faith. That $2,500.00 was paid from said proceeds to 
Plaintiff's counsel. That $2,500.00,together with the 
difference between $11,326.00 and $7,500.00 are 
consequential damages sustained by Plaintiff as a result of 
Defendant's breach of contract. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith 
and Fair Dealing by State Farm) 
20. The Plaintiff hereby restates all of the 
allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 17 of the 
First Cause of Action as though fully set forth herein. 
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21. That Plaintiff had a justifiable expectation 
that State Farm Insurance would provide to her all amounts 
paid by State Farm for medicals incurred or expenses 
relating to treatment and or rehabilitation of Plaintiff. 
That this information was necessary before a final 
resolution of Plaintiff's claim could be attempted. 
22. That Defendant, State Farm Insurance, acted 
arbitrarily, capriciously or unreasonably by refusing to 
divulge said information to Plaintiff. That said conduct on 
State Farm's part exceeded the justifiable expectations of 
the Plaintiff and she should be awarded compensatory 
damages, and punitive damages for said culpable conduct. 
That said conduct on the part of State Farm was unreasonable 
under the facts of this case. 
That State Farm breached its duty to the Plaintiff 
by failing to employ two (2) separate adjusters, one for the 
Plaintiff and one for the other driver. That State Farm 
further breached its duty by failing to advise the Plaintiff 
of their extensive use of him as an expert witness in 
numerous third party claim suits. That State Farm further 
breached its duty by creating and or maintaining the obvious 
conflicts of interest between IRA, Dr. Edward C. Spencer, 
State Farm and the Plaintiff. 
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23. Because of the Defendant's actions in denying 
the Plaintiff her right to settle her claim in good faith, 
the Plaintiff should be awarded damages for attorney's fees 
incurred together with that amount which she could 
reasonably have settled her claim for had the Defendant not 
acted in bad faith, to-wit: $11,326.00 less the $7,500.00 
actually received. 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Fraud) 
24. The Plaintiff hereby restates all of the 
allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 23 of the 
Plaintiff's First and Second Cause of Action as though fully 
set forth herein. 
25. That State Farm, through its employee, Felix 
Jensen, failed to disclose to Plaintiff that Dr. Edward C. 
Spencer had been in fact employed by Defendant on numerous 
occasions as a medical expert in third party claims. That 
Defendant either led the Plaintiff to believe or allowed the 
Plaintiff to believe without disclosure that Dr. Edward C. 
Spencer would care for and meet her medical needs without 
having to consider the needs of State Farm. By acting for 
State Farm and for the Plaintiff the doctor was serving two 
masters at one time and the arrangement clearly constituted 
9 
a conflict of interest. 
26. That State Farm, through its agent, Felix 
Jensen, failed to disclose to Plaintiff that employees of 
IRA (nurses) were actually non-testimonial experts preparing 
for trial (as represented by counsel for State Farm) and not 
health care providers helping with her rehabilitation. That 
this arrangement was contrary to representations in the 
advertising brochure of IRA and contrary to the medical 
reports and correspondence of the registered nurses. 
27. That State Farm had actual or constructive 
knowledge of the false representations or deceitful actions 
of its employee and the IRA employees. 
28. That State Farm, through Felix Jensen, 
arranged the involvement of IRA with Plaintiff for the 
purpose of minimizing medical expenses and eventual damages 
and not to meet Plaintiff's medical problems. That IRA 
now claims it was only evaluating Plaintiff's rehabilitation 
needs and not providing rehabilitation services. 
29. That Plaintiff relied upon the actions of 
State Farm and its misrepresentations by non-disclosure to 
her detriment and has been denied reasonable medical care as 
a result thereof. Further, the Plaintiff has suffered 
severe physical and mental pain as a result of said deceit. 
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30. That as a result of State Farm's fraudulent 
acts the Plaintiff is entitled to punitive damages in 
addition to compensatory damages listed above together with 
that amount of attorney's fees she was required to pay on 
contingency together with court costs incurred herein. That 
Defendant attempted to deceive the Plaintiff by advising her 
that she was not entitled to know the amount paid to IRA 
since the Defendant paid those sums and they were not 
medical expenses. These actions were all contrary to 
customary insurance practice. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment against 
the Defendant, State Farm, as follows: 
1. On her first cause of action the Plaintiff 
should be awarded a judgment against the Defendant for a 
breach of contract for failing to faithfully perform its 
insurance contract with the Plaintiff as its first party 
insured. That Plaintiff is entitled to a judgment for 
consequential damages of $8,826.00, which sum represents the 
difference between their offer of $2,500.00 and the average 
maximum amount customarily offered by insurance adjusters; 
$11,326.00, as set forth in the "affidavit" of Milton Beck. 
Further, the Plaintiff should be awarded that amount that 
will reimburse her for any medical expenses she may incur in 
11 
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the future as a result of Defendant's actions including an 
award for future physical pain and suffering, and costs of 
this action. 
2. On Plaintiff's Second Cause of Action she 
should be awarded a judgment for Defendant's breach of its 
implied covenant to deal fairly with the Plaintiff. By 
failing to provide Plaintiff with unbiased health care 
providers and an independent adjuster the Defendant acted 
arbitrarily and capriciously and denied Plaintiff the 
reasonable and justifiable expectations of her contract. 
The conflict of interest between IRA, State Farm and 
Plaintiff clearly violated the spirit and terms of her 
insurance contract. That such culpable conduct justifies an 
award to Plaintiff of compensatory damages in the sum of 
$8,826.00 together with costs incurred herein, attorney fees 
and punitive damages. 
3. On Plaintiff's Third Cause of Action Plaintiff 
is entitled to a judgment for Defendant's fraudulent or 
deceitful actions in providing the services of IRA and 
creating the subsequent conflict of interest. That Plaintiff 
is entitled to damages in the sum of $8,826.00, damages for 
future physical pain and suffering, attorney's fees, 
punitive damages and costs incurred herein. 
12 
000012 
DATED this 
Plaintiff's address: 
6903 South 775 East 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
,1989, 
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PHILIP R. FISHLER, #1083 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7080 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
FAY I. PIXTON, 
Plaintiff, ) ANSWER TO AMENDED 
) COMPLAINT 
VS. ) 
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE ) 
INSURANCE COMPANY OF BLOOMING- ) 
TON, ILLINOIS and INTERNATIONAL ) Civil No. C87-1665 
REHABILITATION ASSOCIATES, INC. ) 
) Judge Michael R. Murphy 
Defendants. ) 
COMES NOW the defendant, State Farm Mutual Automobile 
Insurance Company and in answer to plaintifffs complaint on file 
herein admits, denies and alleges as follows: 
1. That plaintiff's amended complaint fails to state a 
cause of action against this defendant upon which relief can be 
granted. 
2. Admits the allegations contained in paragraph 1, and 2 
of the amended complaint and further admits that the plaintiff 
was insured under a policy of automobile insurance issued by this 
defendant which provided among other coverage personal injury 
protection benefits. 
3. This defendant admits that on or about March 12, 1984, 
plaintiff was the operator of an automobile which collided with 
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another automobile also insured by this defendant. And further 
that the accident occurred in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
but this defendant denies each and every other allegation of 
plaintiff's complaint not otherwise admitted or denied on the 
ground and for the reason that this defendant is without suffi-
cient knowledge or information on which to form a belief as to 
the truthfulness of said allegations. 
4. That the plaintiff has failed to mitigate her damages. 
5. That the plaintiff by her conduct either waived any 
claim that she may have against this defendant or in the alterna-
tive is estopped by virtue of her conduct from bringing any 
claims against this defendant. 
6. That plaintiffs own negligence, carelessness or other 
culpable conduct either personally or through her counsel con-
tributed to any loss or damage which plaintiff may have sus-
tained, said damage is expressly denied and that this negligence, 
carelessness or other culpable conduct on the part of the plain-
tiff either personally or through counsel is equal to or greater 
than any negligence, carelessness or other culpable conduct on 
the part of this defendant and that therefore plaintiff's claims 
are barred. 
7. That punitive damages are barred by the due process 
clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
and by Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution of Utah. 
8. That punitive damages are barred by the right against 
self-incrimination provided by the Fifth Amendment to the United 
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States Constitution and Article I, Section 12 of the Constitution 
of Utah. 
9. That punitive damages are barred by the cruel and 
unusual punishment clause and the excessive fine clause of the 
Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and by Article 
I, Section 9 of the Constitution of Utah. 
10. That punitive damages are barred by the equal protec-
tion clause of the Fourteen Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. 
11. That the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion and Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution of Utah, 
prohibit any award of punitive damages unless there is an un-
animous verdict. 
12. That Utah Code Annotated S76-3-302 prohibits under any 
circumstances any award of punitive damages in excess of $20,000 
for a corporate defendant and $10,000 for an individual defen-
dant. 
13. That the defendant, its agents, servants or employees, 
did not act with actual malice and any award of punitive damages 
is therefore barred. 
14. No act or omission of this defendant was done with 
reckless indifference or reckless disregard toward the rights or 
safety of others and therefore any award of punitive damages is 
barred. 
15. That plaintiff must prove each and every element of the 
punitive damage claim beyond a reasonable doubt. 
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16. Plaintiff must prove each and every element of the 
punitive damage award by clear and convincing evidence. 
17. Under no circumstances may the defendant be held 
derivatively liable for the award of punitive damage. 
18. As a matter of law punitive damages may not be awarded 
in this case, because any outrageous and malicious conduct which 
is expressly denied and subsequent like conduct is likely to be 
deterred by other means. 
19. As a matter of law punitive damages may not be awarded 
in this case because this case because this case is not an 
"exceptional" case. 
20. That punitive damages are barred by the contracts 
clause of Article I, Section 10 of the United states constitu-
tion. 
21. That punitive damages have an unacceptable "chilling" 
effect on the open courts clause of Article I, Section 11 of the 
Constitution of Utah and therefore denied due process. 
22. That the law does not allow punitive damage awards in a 
contract action. 
WHEREFORE having fully answered plaintiff's amended com-
plaint, this defendant prays that the plaintiff take nothing by 
reason thereof, that the action be dismissed, no cause of action, 
that this defendant be awarded its costs of court herein incurred 
and for such other and further relief as to the court seems just 
and equitable in the premises. 
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DATED t h i s n /rxX day of 1 IA 
TV 
, 1989, 
STRONG & HANNI 
IPhflip R. Fishier 
Attorneys for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
This is to certify that a true and exact copy of the forego-
ing Answer to Amended Complaint was mailed, postage prepaid, to 
the following on this _£_ day of 
Matt Biljanic 
Attorney at Law 
7355 South 9th East 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
f\i*W\^ , 1989. 
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FILED BlSTBiCT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
Philip R. Fishier, #1083 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7080 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
FAY I. PIXTON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSUR-
ANCE CO. OF BLOOMINGTON, ILLINOIS, ] 
and INTERNATIONAL REHABILITATION ] 
ASSOCIATES, INC., 
Defendants. 
i ORDER 
1 Civil 
Judge 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
NO. 870901665PI 
Michael R. Murphy 
The Motion for Summary Judgment of the defendant, state Farm, 
came on regularly for hearing on November 20, 1989 at the hour of 
2:00 p.m. before the Honorable Michael R. Murphy, District Judge, 
with Matt Biljanic appearing on behalf of the plaintiff and Philip 
R. Fishier and Stephen J. Trayner appearing on behalf of the 
defendant, State Farm. The Court having heard argument of counsel, 
considered the memoranda on file together with all of the other 
documents now in the file including the various affidavits, and 
being fully advised in the premises, the Court concludes that there 
was no conflict on the part of Mr. Felix Jensen in handling the 
first and third party claims of the plaintiff since Mr. Jensen, as 
DEC 7 1989 
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a representative of State Farm in both capacities, was acting in 
an adversarial capacity to the insured, Mrs. Pixton. Furthermore, 
the Court concludes that this is a third party type of claim and 
that the plaintiff waived her claim by settling the third party 
personal injury action which was pending before Judge Frederick of 
this Court. The Court is of the opinion that all issues concerning 
the sums paid to IRA could have been presented in that action but 
were not. The Court, having considered the affidavit of Mr. Beck 
filed in this case, concludes that it is not applicable to this 
case since this is a third party type of claim which should have 
been concluded in the litigation pending before Judge Frederick of 
this Court. The Court, therefore, being fully advised in the 
premises and on the grounds and for the reasons stated above and 
also as stated by the Court in it's Bench Ruling of November 20, 
1989 and it appearing to the Court that there is no genuine issue 
as to a material fact, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the defendant, 
State Farm's Motion for Summary Judgment be and the same is hereby 
granted and the claims of the plaintiff as to defendant, state 
Farm, are dismissed with prejudice. 
DATED this 7 day of x IfS^sy /KA^ , 1989. 
Michael R. Murphy, District/Jud^e 
- 2 -
uuoo?o 
CERTIFICATION OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this of November , 1989, 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was mailed, 
postage prepaid to: 
Matt Biljanic 
Attorney at Law 
7355 South Ninth East 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
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PHILIP R. FISHLER, #1083 
STEPHEN J. TRAYNER, #4928 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorneys for Defendant 
State Farm Mutual Automobile 
Insurance Company 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7080 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
FAY I. PIXTON, ) 
Plaintiff, ) AFFIDAVIT OF 
) SAMANTHA BIRD 
vs. ) 
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE ) Civil No. C87-1665 
INSURANCE COMPANY OF BLOOMINGTON) 
ILLINOIS and INTERNATIONAL ) Judge Michael R. Murphy 
REHABILITATION ASSOCIATES, INC.,) 
Defendants. ) 
Affiant, Samantha Bird, having been first duly sworn, 
deposes and states as follows: 
1. Affiant is a resident claims superintendent for defen-
dant, State Farm. 
2. Affiant is personally familiar with and has reviewed 
State Farm claim file no. 44-394-939. 
3* State Farm claim file no. 44-394-939 pertains to plain-
tiff's claim for no-fault benefits under her policy of insurance 
with State Farm, policy no. 477-6467-44, and plaintiff's claim 
for damages against another State Farm insured, Robert J. Davies, 
arising out of an automobile accident dated March 12, 1984. 
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4. Affiant's duties include supervising the handling of 
State Farm claim file no. 44-394-939. 
5- State Farm claim file no. 44-394-939 has been kept in 
the ordinary course of State Farm's business and the entries 
found therein were made contemporaneous to the events so record-
ed. 
6. State Farm claim file no. 44-394-939 shows that State 
Farm has duly paid every medical expense or other covered expense 
submitted by plaintiff to State Farm for payment relating to from 
the injuries plaintiff allegedly sustained in her automobile 
accident of March 12, 1984. 
7. State Farm claim file no. 44-394-939 shows that State 
Farm has made payments totalling $871.51, exclusive of the cost 
of IRA's services, under plaintiff's no-fault insurance coverage. 
8. State Farm claim file no. 44-394-939 shows that State 
Farm paid $1,960.09 to IRA for its valuative services. 
9. Affiant did not refer plaintiff to Dr. Edward C. Spencer 
for treatment at any time for the injuries she allegedly sus-
tained in the subject automobile accident. 
10. Affiant is familiar with the medical report prepared by 
Dr. Edward C. Spencer respecting plaintiff's medical condition 
and Dr. Spencer's treatment of plaintiff for the injuries that 
she allegedly sustained in the subject automobile accident. 
11. Affiant's responsibilities with defendant, state Farm 
include the evaluation of cases for the purpose of making settle-
ment offers. As part of affiant's responsibilities, affiant 
takes into consideration available medical records and reports, 
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such as those prepared by Dr- Edward C. Spencer on the plaintiff, 
in making settlement offers. 
12- Based upon affiant's experience in the automobile 
insurance industry and her review of the medical records and 
« 
reports submitted by plaintiff in this matter, affiant believes 
that the settlement offer accepted by plaintiff, $7,500, was fair 
and equitable to all the parties concerned. 
DATED this /3 day of i/{ML/S , 1989. 
^ t ^ j 
i * 
JSAMANTHA BIRD 
ss 
) 
ay of I<4&A*L£<^ , 1 9 8 _ , personally 
appeared"before me Samantha Birti who duly acknowledged to me that 
he has read and signed the foregoing Affidavit for and the same 
are true and correct to the best of his information, knowledge 
and belief. 
*OTAp&>PUBL 
Residing S^L; 
My Commission Expires 
/ / • 
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PHILIP R. FISHLER, #1083 
STEPHEN J. TRAYNER, #4928 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorneys for Defendant 
State Farm Mutual Automobile 
Insurance Company-
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7080 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
FAY I. PIXTON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE 
INSURANCE COMPANY OF BLOOMINGTON] 
ILLINOIS and INTERNATIONAL ] 
REHABILITATION ASSOCIATES, INC.,] 
Defendants. ; 
1 AFFIDAVIT OF 
I FELIX JENSEN 
' Civil NO. C87-1665 
Judge Michael R. Murphy 
Affiant, Felix Jensen, having been first duly sworn deposes 
and states as follows: 
1. Affiant is a claims specialist for defendant, State 
Farm* 
2. Affiant is personally familiar with and'has reviewed 
State Farm claim file no. 44-394-939, pertaining to plaintiff's 
claim for no-fault benefits under her policy of insurance, policy 
no. 477-6467-44, and plaintiff's claim for damages against 
another State Farm insured, Robert J. Davies. 
3. Affiant has not at any time directed plaintiff to seek 
medical treatment from Edward C. Spencer, nor has affiant ever 
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recommended that plaintiff seek treatment from Dr. Spencer for 
the injuries she allegedly sustained in her automobile accident 
of March 12, 1984. 
DATED this / ^7 day of <3~ii ^ C^ , 1989. 
(^<y£*r sJ^^iu^j 
FELIX J E N S E N y 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
l 
On the i'}v day of » J u til / 198j^, personally 
appeared before me Felix Jensen who duly aclcnowledged to me that 
he has read and signed the foregoing Affidavit for and the same 
are true and correct to the best of his information, knowledge 
and belief. 
"7 
{<& 7 If{—r^C/^l 'X/ (til 
' s. 
My Commission Expires 
NOTARY PUBLIC / l ^ J 
Residing at:J^ (f /,f(Jc£ />,?,, h/^T 
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Lowell V. Smith, #3006 
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH 
A Professional Corporation 
Attorneys for Defendants 
4 Triad Center, Suite 500 
P.O. Box 2970 
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-2970 
(801) 363-7611 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
FAY I. PIXTON, 
Plaintiff, ; 
v« \ 
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY OF j 
BLOOMINGTON, ILLINOIS and ! 
INTERNATIONAL REHABILITATION : 
ASSOCIATES, INC., ; 
Defendants. : 
: AFFIDAVIT OF 
: LOWELL SMITH 
: Civil No.: C87-1665 
: Judge Michael R. Murphy 
Affiant, Lowell Smith, having been first duly sworn, 
deposes and states as follows: 
1. I served as counsel for Robert J. Davies dba 
Sherwood Florist and Carl E. Hothan in the action brought by 
plaintiff against Mr- Davies and Mr. Hothan in the Third Judicial 
District Court of Salt Lake County, C87-7987, for damages and 
injuries allegedly arising out of an automobile accident which 
occurred on March 12, 1984. 
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2. During the pendency of that litigation, Attorney 
Matt Biljanic, representing Fay I. Pixton, served Interrogatories 
on the Defendants, on February 4, 1988, requesting the number of 
payments made by State Farm Insurance to International 
Rehabilitation Associates for the services rendered by State Farm 
Insurance Company to Plaintiff and seeking the total amount paid 
by the no-fault insurance carrier which was claimed Hexempt from 
the Plaintiff's claim...". 
3. On March 4, 1988, I received a letter from State 
Farm Insurance Company indicating that they had paid the sum of 
$871.51 in medical expenses and $708.00 in loss of services to 
Mrs, Pixton. It was also disclosed that State Farm had made 
payment of $1,960.09 to International Rehabilitation Associates 
for expenses associated with the evaluative services rendered for 
State Farm. 
4. Initially objection was made concerning the 
disclosure of the information sought. However, on March 30, 
1989, Defendants disclosed: 
State Farm Insurance Company has paid $871.51 
in medical expenses * and $708.00 in lost 
services. In addition, State Farm Insurance 
Company has paid $1,960.09 to International 
Rehabilitation Associates. 
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5. On April 5/ 1988 Attorney Biljanic requested a 
-breakdown of the $1,960.09" disclosed. He requested whether or 
not this figure included the purchase of an exercise cycle. 
6. On April 18, 1988 it was disclosed to Attorney 
Biljanic that the $871.51 paid in medical expenses included the 
exercycle. In addition, State Farm paid Mrs. Pixton the sum of 
$708.00 for services. Further, State Farm paid IRA the sum of 
$1,960.00. 
7. On May 24, 1988 copies of the drafts from State 
Farm Insurance Company to IRA were forwarded to Attorney 
Biljanic. 
8. On or about May 9, 1989, Attorney Biljanic agreed 
to accept the sum of $7,500 in full and complete satisfaction of 
plaintiff's claims against the alleged tort feasors, Robert J. 
Davies dba Sherwood Florist and Carl E. Hothan. 
9. The matter was dismissed on June 13, 1989, by 
Stipulation of the parties and by Order of the Court. 
DATED this 'd-f day of June, 1989. 
LOWELL V. SMITH 
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STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
On the ^<^— day of June, 1989, personally appeared 
before me Lowell Smith who duly acknowledged to me that he has 
read and signed the foregoing Affidavit for and the same are true 
and correct to the best of his information, knowledge and belief. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Res iding: gW/ //>A^  6& /I htU-
My Commission Expires: 
A/?- 9o 
-4-
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PHILIP R. FISHLER, #1083 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7080 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
FAY I. PIXTON, ) 
Plaintiff, ) AFFIDAVIT OF 
) DR. EDWARD C. SPENCER 
VS. ) 
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE ) 
INSURANCE COMPANY OF BLOOMING- ) 
TON, ILLINOIS and INTERNATIONAL ) Civil No. C87-1665 
REHABILITATION ASSOCIATES, INC, ) 
) Judge Michael R. Murphy 
Defendants. ) 
Affiant, Edward c. Spencer, having been first duly sworn, 
deposes and states as follows: 
1. Affiant obtained his medical degree at George Washington 
University. He did his internship in Iowa and received a degree 
in orthopedic surgery from the University of Iowa in 1975. Affiant 
became board certified in 1976 in orthopedic surgery. Affiant has 
been in private practice since 1975. 
2. Affiant first treated plaintiff on May 17, 1984 for 
injuries plaintiff claimed to have sustained in an automobile 
accident on March 12, 1984. 
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3. Affiant was not contacted by Felix Jensen or any other 
employees of State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company and 
asked to treat plaintiff's injuries. 
4. The medical history obtained by affiant from plaintiff 
indicates that she was referred to affiant's care by a 
Dr. Matthews, 
5. Affiant's treatment and evaluation of plaintiff's injuries 
was not influenced or affected by any actions of defendant, State 
Farm or its employees. 
6. Although affiant has from time to time performed 
independent medical examinations and given expert testimony at the 
request of defendant, State Farm, affiant's prior relationship with 
State Farm did not influence or affect his treatment or evaluation 
of plaintiff. 
7. Affiant's treatment of plaintiff and affiant's evaluation 
of plaintiff's medical condition were within the acceptable medical 
standards of the community. 
DATED this i^{ day of 1989 
2£L 
#0 E*ta <\ 
:o, Si. 
Dr. Edward c. Spencer 
r * JulyZ7.1992 
" IRKGIFFO t K RD ? 
STATE OF UTAH 
SS 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
On the t/ day of L* 
3 
9 
, Salt Late Oty.mah * 
V l V 84103 <&>" 
%fr OF ^ 
198^7
 / personally 
appeared before me Dr. Edward C. Spencer who duly acknowledged to 
me that he has read and signed the foregoing Affidavit for and 
the same are true and correct to the best of his information, OOOO^P 
My Commission Expires NOTARY/PUBVIC 
knowledge and belief 
residing/a 
